約翰·奧斯汀
分析法學派創(chuàng)始人
Words can be used not just to describe reality， but to create new realities.
In language， there is no one-to-one correspondence between words and the things they refer to.
Language is not just a system of symbols， but a set of practices with social and cultural significance.
The meaning of a sentence is not just in the words themselves， but also in the illocutionary act it performs.
Speech is a kind of action， and our words are the tools we use to perform it.
To utter a performative is not to make a statement， and therefore the utterance of a performative is neither true nor false.
Words can be tools， but they can also be weapons.
The meaning of a word is not a mental entity， but a social practice.
To do things with words is not a special kind of doing， but a special kind of speaking.
Words and deeds are not separate， but intimately connected.
The total speech act comprises both the act of uttering words and the act of meaning.
In saying that someone did something， we may be doing something ourselves.
To understand a sentence means to understand a language.
A statement is a means to convey information， a promise is a means to make a commitment.
We can say things with words； and we can do things with words.
A 'performative' utterance is not true or false， but happy or unhappy.
We can talk about a happening in three main ways: by describing it， by recounting its history， by telling a story about it.
To say something is to perform an action， and to perform an action is to do something with words.
When we speak of 'meaning' a word， we are in the first instance speaking of a certain kind of act.
To understand the meaning of a sentence， we must consider the speaker's intention and the context of the utterance.
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